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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we develop a method to create a large, la-
beled dataset of visible network device vendors across the
Internet by mapping network-visible IP addresses to device
vendors. We use Internet-wide scanning, banner grabs of
network-visible devices across the IPv4 address space, and
clustering techniques to assign labels to more than 160,000
devices. We subsequently probe these devices and use fea-
tures extracted from the responses to train a classifier that
can accurately classify device vendors. Finally, we demon-
strate how this method can be used to understand broader
trends across the Internet by predicting device vendors in
traceroutes from CAIDA’s Archipelago measurement sys-
tem and subsequently examining vendor distributions across
these traceroutes.
1 INTRODUCTION
Understanding the prevalence of different network device
vendors can lend insights into the robustness (or fragility)
of the underlying infrastructure. These devices run software
that can contain vulnerabilities [24, 23, 12, 6, 26, 5], and
concerns have been raised about the possibilities of “back-
doors” [16]. Users and organizationsmaywant better ways to
gain insights into the vendors of devices that are deployed in
different parts of the network; nations may also be interested
in gathering this intelligence on a broader scale.
Despite the benefits of fingerprinting network devices,
doing so at scale, remotely, is challenging. One challenge is
gathering enough data to develop models that can accurately
classify devices bymanufacturer. Scanning devices across the
Internet is costly enough, but even given data from Internet
scans, the data lacks labels.
In this paper, we develop a method that can associate
network devices with vendors. The first step of the process
involves compiling a large, labeled dataset of more than
160,000 IP-visible network devices across the Internet; for
this part of the process, we use banner grabs from SSH, Telnet,
and SNMP to associate labels with corresponding network-
level devices. More specifically, we use a novel clustering
approach to extract vendor labels from banners. Second, we
develop a probing technique that elicits responses from these
devices and can be used at scale, build a feature set based on
these responses, and train a classifier that predicts a vendor
that corresponds to an IP address with over 90% accuracy.
This second step is critical in allowing us to conduct a large-
scale survey of network devices: rather than only being able
to classify devices that have open SSH, Telnet, or SNMP
ports, we can now classify any device that responds to the
measurement probes that we send.
The resulting measurements contain some sampling bias—
in particular, the resulting set only represents measurements
of devices that are visible at the network layer and that re-
spond to the probes. Yet, assuming that any resulting conclu-
sions account for this bias, the set of measurements is consid-
erably larger than any existing dataset of its kind and allows
researchers to garner new insights from existing datasets.
Such a labeled dataset has considerable utility for the mea-
surement community, including the ability to augment exist-
ing datasets with these labels. We demonstrate the insights
that a model trained on a labeled dataset can yield by assign-
ing labels to network IP addresses in the CAIDA Archipelago
traceroute dataset and exploring the differences in the distri-
bution of vendors on traceroutes from the United States and
Germany destined to different continents.
2 GENERATING LABELED DATA AT SCALE
Figure 1 shows our pipeline for classifying network devices
at scale. The first step in the pipeline involves creating a
dataset that associates IP addresses with labels of different
device vendors. As with many supervised machine learning
problems, acquiring or generating a large labeled dataset
can be a significant challenge. In this section, we present
the method we develop for generating and curating such a
dataset and describe the properties of the resulting dataset.
More specifically, we combine clustering techniques with
Telnet, Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) and Simple NetworkMan-
agement Protocol (SNMP) banners to aid in identifying the
vendor of a given device. Connecting to devices through
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these protocols can elicit a banner, which can then be exam-
ined to determine the vendor of the device. While we use
the methods in this section to label network devices, the
approach can be generalized to other problem domains.
2.1 Banner Grabs
Candidate IP Addresses. As our goal is to classify network
devices, not end hosts, we rely on the CAIDA Macroscopic
Internet Topology Data Kit (ITDK), which provides us with
an IPv4 router topology [3]. The topology is produced from
traceroutes from December 24, 2019 to January 7, 2020 from
159 vantage points in 50 different countries.1 The topology
provides us with over 100 million IP addresses associated
with routers across the Internet, the ability to map each IP
address to its corresponding router, and a mapping from each
network device to the ASN controlling it.
We grab the banners for each of the over 100 million IP
addresses in the IPv4 topology using zgrab2 [14]. Zgrab2 sup-
ports SSH and Telnet banner grabs by default, and we build
a custom module for SNMP banner grabs.2 Table 1 examines
the magnitude and rate of response of this process at differ-
ent granularities. We see that although a small percentage
of devices respond to the requests, almost 2 million unique
devices respond to one of the banner grabs. Furthermore,
these devices are spread across over 18,000 ASes, accounting
for over 30% of the ASes we probed.
2.2 Labeling
Given the set of IP addresses and corresponding banners, we
attempt to match each IP address with a vendor.
2.2.1 Vendor name matching. We first try a simple, intuitive
heuristic of matching an IP to a vendor label by searching
for vendor names directly inside the banners. We collected a
list of 40 network vendors from Wikipedia [17]. We present
the full list in Appendix A.1. Table 2 shows the results of
this method. We immediately see that Cisco dominates the
results. Upon inspection, we find that Cisco has a branded
SSH version which contributes to many of the labels.
This approach extracts an adequate amount of labels for
some vendors, but can miss many phrases in the banners that
may indicate the vendor of the router without actually in-
cluding the vendor’s name. Furthermore, vendors with more
generic names will cause many conflicts or inaccurate labels
using this method. For example, searching for “extreme” for
Extreme Networks may include generic text about “extreme
1CAIDA’s ITDK contains two topologies, one optimized for accuracy of
aliases and one optimized for coverage of aliases. We use the topology
optimized for accuracy.
2SNMP “banners” are collected with a bulk query for âĂĲSystemâĂİ records.
consequences for unauthorized connections.” We encoun-
tered 168 conflicts using this approach where one banner
matched multiple different vendor names.
2.2.2 Clustering. We now develop a more sophisticated ap-
proach to labeling IP addresses, based on the intuition that
vendors configure devices with default banner formatting
that is often unique to a particular vendor. This default for-
matting may contain vendor names, model numbers, warn-
ing messages, login prompts or other technical phrases or
sequences of characters that can be matched to a vendor
through web searches. By collecting these phrases, we are
able to label significantly more devices for many vendors
and also discover new vendors.
We design an iterative clustering algorithm to search for
potential matching phrases or “fingerprints.” Clustering ban-
ners is a unique challenge that is not easily compatible with
standard bag-of-words NLP models. Banner texts are overall
very similar, and features such as word ordering of arbitrary
lengths and whitespace can be very indicative. In addition,
terms that differ by one character (such as model numbers)
may still be strongly related, and the clustering should group
them together. We therefore cluster banners using their pair-
wise edit distances, which preserves banner structure.
We iteratively cluster random samples of unlabeled IP
addresses, and use these clusters to generate fingerprints.
TakeN to be the dataset of banners. For each banner protocol,
we repeatedly sample M IP addresses from N where M ≤
1000 (explained at the end of this section). For each sample,
we compute anMxM symmetric edit distance matrix, where
Mi, j = Mj,i is the edit distance between banner i and banner
j. Specifically, if len(i) ≤ len(j), we computeMi, j by finding
the Levenshtein edit distances between i and all len(i)-length
substrings of j and taking the minimum distance.
We then perform clustering on matrixM for each banner
protocol using HDBSCAN* [19]. We set min_cluster_size
andmin_samples to 5, which causes HDBSCAN* to aggres-
sively form small, tight clusters. HDBSCAN* also produces
“noise” clusters for banners that do not strongly cluster, which
we discard.
For each non-noise cluster, we identify potential finger-
prints by computing the matching sequences of characters
between all combinations of banners and sorting them by fre-
quency. We then link the most frequent sequences to vendors
by manually searching on Google, Shodan, and Censys [7].
Possible links include vendor names, model numbers, router
documentation books, vendor support forums and mailing
lists, blog posts, and other banner protocols (e.g. FTP). For
example, routeros ccr1 is from a MikroTik router family,
and welcome to zxr is from a ZTE router family.
If we encounter multiple similar fingerprints in a cluster,
we manually create a regex fingerprint to capture them. For
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Figure 1: Analysis pipeline.
example:
\(ttyp[\d\w]\)\r\u0000\r\n\r\u0000\r\nlogin
is used very frequently by Juniper routers. If a fingerprint
can be linked to multiple vendors or a misleading resource,
such as a textbook or enterprise customer, we ignore it. We
also create a “blacklist” for fingerprints linked to consumer
routers or endpoints, which we exclude from labeling.
After clusters of matrixM have been examined, we apply
our current set of fingerprints to all IP addresses and resolve
conflicts that arise. Since we label the entire set of IPs after
each iteration of clustering, each iteration may significantly
reduce the remaining sample space of unlabeled IP addresses,
so choosing sampling small matricesM is sufficient.
2.2.3 Conflict resolution. Conflicting labels can arise when
1) a short fingerprint matches too many banners as part of a
longer sequence, or 2) devices include sequences from other
vendors in their banners. If we can confidently identify the
most likely vendor of a set of conflicts after additional web
searches or close inspection, we set that vendor’s fingerprint
to supersede the other. For example, we found SNMP banners
which contained fingerprints for H3C or MikroTik as well
as Huawei. On closer inspection, we determined them to be
H3C or MikroTik routers owned by Huawei, as they also
included H3C or MikroTik model numbers and OS versions.
If a fingerprint creates conflicts withmore than one vendor,
we remove the fingerprint. For example:
user access verification\r\n\r\nusername
is a well-established Cisco Telnet banner fingerprint, and it
appears in Recog, an open source fingerprint database [22].
Clustering identified this fingerprint, and this fingerprint
matched over 20,000 Cisco devices as well as devices with
fingerprints from four other vendors.
2.2.4 Results. Ultimately, we are able to identify 30 differ-
ent vendors and label over 175,000 IP addresses using our
clustering approach, while our blacklist filters out an addi-
tional 140,000 consumer or endpoint devices. Clustering pro-
duced fewer than 20 conflicts throughout the entire process,
compared to 168 conflicts from the vendor name matching
Table 1: Response rates to different banner grabs at
multiple granularities.
Banner Type IP Addresses Network Devices ASes
SSH 1,399,147 (1.3%) 1,396,132 (1.3%) 13,791 (23.3%)
Telnet 351,783 (0.3%) 349,519 (0.3%) 6,423 (10.9%)
SNMP 181,732 (0.2%) 179,572 (0.2%) 7,030 (11.9%)
Union 1,822,144 (1.7%) 1,815,437 (1.7%) 18,642 (31.4%)
approach, which provides confidence that the process gener-
ates fingerprints with sufficiently low entropy. Table 2 shows
the most frequently labeled vendors.
We find many banners without vendor-specific phrases
which cannot be assigned a label. For example, 93% of SSH
banners only contain versions of Linux or general SSH
servers such as OpenSSH and Dropbear. Common reasons
we were not able to associate banners with vendors were
short authentication prompts (login: or password), client-
side SSH errors (connection closed by remote host)
or empty banners.3 Lastly, banner structures which appear
very infrequently in our dataset are likely filtered out by
HDBSCAN* into the “noise” cluster.
Note that this approach is susceptible to introducing er-
rors or failing to detect conflicts, due to incomplete research,
banner data, or fingerprints, as well as devices which im-
personate other vendor banners. For our purposes, a small
amount of noise in labels will have a negligible impact on
classifier performance. More broadly, despite these potential
pitfalls, our method provides the first fingerprint dataset tar-
geting network vendors learned from clustering and backed
by web research, and we show this is a promising approach
for future label generation.
3 CLASSIFYING NETWORK DEVICES
To classify network devices at scale, we need to compile a
set of probes that elicit unique responses from each network
device vendor, extract a set of features from the responses,
3Note that we treat all output from zgrab as banners. While that can include
certain client-side prompts and errors, our approach to clustering filters
those types of banners from our classification.
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Table 2: Labeled dataset. The first two columns repre-
sent labels generated from two different approaches.
The last column represents the dataset resulting after
removing unresponsive IP addresses and de-aliasing
IP addresses to one device.
Manufacturer IP Address Labels:Regex Match
IP Address Labels:
Clustering
Network Device Labels:
Responsive
Cisco 63,990 85,379 83,592
Mikrotik 9,700 39,243 38,134
Huawei 17,134 17,075 16,210
H3C 10,231 10,620 10,183
NEC 8 6,934 6,918
Lancom 4,372 4,282 4,098
Juniper 59 4,255 4,065
Adtran 1,741 3,527 3,497
ZTE 2,462 2,318 2,226
Ubiquoss 8 1,887 1,869
Dell 59 1,883 1,849
and train a model to distinguish the vendors using those
features. There are many challenges to fingerprinting net-
work devices at scale which must be acknowledged. A subset
of devices are not visible at the IP layer, and some devices
may not respond to probe-based measurements. We cannot
fingerprint these devices with our techniques. Furthermore,
a single IP-visible device can be associated with multiple IP
addresses. We mitigate double counting labeled devices by
dealiasing IP addresses to a single device. Finally, we must
use our smaller set of labeled devices, which may not fully
represent the larger set of unlabeled devices, to train a model
for classifying unlabeled devices. We acknowledge there may
be bias in our labeled dataset but still believe it to be the most
principled approach to tackle the challenge of classifying
network devices at scale.
3.1 Network Device Probes and Features
Many devices, such as web servers, have a standard port
that is open for connections. Many network devices, on the
other hand, have no such port. One option is to find an open
port by scanning the ports of each device before probing.
Unfortunately, this is not scalable and, even worse, many
network devices may have no open ports at all. As such, we
only consider probes that either require no port or that are
specifically sent to closed ports on the target machine.
3.1.1 Nmap. Probes. Nmap is perhaps the most popular ac-
tive OS fingerprinting tool and has been developed for over
20 years [18]. Nmap’s OS fingerprinting system is thorough,
first scanning the 1,000 most popular open ports on a device
to find an open port. It then sends up to 16 specially crafted
TCP, UDP, and ICMP probes to the device that are intended
to invoke a unique response. While 10 of these probes are
sent to an open port, 6 of these probes (3 TCP, 1 UDP, 2 ICMP)
are sent specifically to a closed port on the device. The 3 TCP
probes differ in their options and flags, the UDP probe is sent
to elicit an ICMP error message from the remote device, and
the 2 ICMP packets are ICMP echo packets with differing
types and IP header values. More details on these probes can
be found in Appendix A.2. We use these 6 probes as a base
set of probes to send to each IP address.
Probe implementation. We directly port the Nmap
closed port probes above into Zmap to facilitate fingerprint-
ing large amounts of devices quickly [8].
Feature extraction. Nmap transforms the responses it
receives into features by applying a series of tests on each
packet. These tests have been developed for over 20 years.
Table 7 in Appendix A.4 shows the list of features that cor-
respond to the closed port probes that we use for the scans.
These features include the options and order of options in
the TCP headers, the behavior of the sequence and acknowl-
edgment numbers in the TCP responses, and the IP initial
time-to-live of the responses.
3.1.2 ICMP. Probes. ICMP provides a unique avenue for use-
ful probes as the protocol is not directed to a particular port,
meaning we can send an ICMP message to a network device
with no open ports and still receive a response. Furthermore,
some network device OSes may restrict access to valid ICMP
requests that can be used for fingeprinting, such as ICMP
timestamp requests, giving insight into the vendor of the
device just by the response (or lack thereof) to the probe [15].
While Nmap incorporates ICMP probes in its fingerprinting
system, it only sends two ICMP echo probes, omitting a wide
variety of ICMP messages that can be sent.
We expand on the set of probes that we can use for finger-
printing through ICMP fuzzing. More specifically, the ICMP
protocol contains a type field that currently has 34 standard-
ized types. Many of these types contain a code field that
specifies sub-types of each message, such as an explanation
for the error that was returned. We enumerate these stan-
dardized types and codes by sending a valid ICMP message
for each pair to each device in the labeled dataset.
Probe implementation. We develop an ICMP fuzzing
system using Scapy that sends a valid ICMPmessage for each
implemented ICMP type and code to each remote device [2].
Feature extraction. We extract each header field and
value of the ICMP responses and encode them as a categorical
feature for the fingerprints. A subset of these features are
shown in Table 7 in Appendix A.4. Features include the type
and code of the ICMP response, the data in the address mask
reply, as well as the ICMP ID and sequence number fields.
3.2 Network Device Classification
We use the dataset of labeled network devices (Table 2), and
our set of probes and features to train a model that predicts
the class of a fingerprint. In this section, we outline our
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choice of model, methods use to train the model, and metrics
for evaluating the trained model.
3.2.1 Model. We consider each feature extracted in Table 7
as a categorical feature. We use a one-hot-encoding (OHE)
to transform each categorical feature into n binary features,
where n is the number of unique values found in the original
categorical feature. We use a random forest model for classi-
fication, motivated by the expectation that specific feature
interactions will be important for performance. Furthermore,
choosing a random forest model allows us to easily interpret
which features are driving the performance of the trained
model.
3.2.2 Metrics. We evaluate the trainedmodels using accuracy,
ROCAUC, and F1 scores. More specifically, we use a balanced
accuracy score to account for any class imbalance in the
data, in which each sample is weighted according to the
inverse prevalence of its true class. This dataset represents a
multiclass classification problem. We consider ROC scores in
a “one-vs-rest” fashion, where each class C is considered as
a binary classification task between C and all other classes.
Furthermore, we use a “micro” averaged F1 score, which
counts the total number of true positives, false positive, and
false negatives. We present the average metrics for a five-fold
cross validation.
3.2.3 Pipeline Evaluation. We probe each IP address in the
labeled dataset, retrying each probe up to three times. For
each probe requiring a port, we choose a high numbered
port at random for each scan (every IP is scanned on the
same ports). Choosing a high-numbered port increases the
likelihood of the port being closed. At this point, we remove
any IP address from the labeled dataset that did not respond
to any probes. After removing unresponsive IP addresses,
we dealias the network devices using the topology provided
by CAIDA’s ITDK. We then filter the number of vendors
down to the final set shown in Table 2 by examining a large
reduction in vendor labels (∼500 devices) from the 11th most
labeled vendor vendor to the 12th.We do not consider devices
outside of these 11 classes for our evaluation.
To address the class imbalance (Table 2), we balance the
classes before training the model to avoid trivializing the
task for the model (learning to predict everything as Cisco).
Specifically, we downsample the Cisco and Mikrotik classes
to 17,000 samples, which is in linewith the 3rdmost prevalent
class in the dataset.
We use scikit-learn’s implementation of a random forest
classifier to train and test models [20]. One-hot encoding
each feature in Table 7 results in more than 1,000 features.
Scikit-learn’s random forest implementation computes the
importance of each feature in the model using the Gini fea-
ture importance, which we use to better understand the
Table 3: Mean classification performance using differ-
ent sets of features across 5-fold cross validation.
Features BalancedAccuracy ROC AUC F1
Nmap 77.3 0.97 86.1
ICMP 54.3 0.91 73.7
Nmap + Top ICMP 91.9 0.99 93.7
model. We perform a randomized hyperparameter search
of 50 different models, varying the number and depth of
trees, the maximum number of features used by the trees,
the minimum samples reqiured for internal and leaf nodes,
if bootstrapping is used, and the function used to measure
split quality. We perform three-fold cross validation on each
model where each fold preserves the percentage of the sam-
ples in each class across the entire dataset.We choose the best
performing model with respect to test accuracy to evaluate
using five-fold cross validation.
Table 3 shows the mean accuracy, ROCAUC, and F1 scores
resulting from five-fold cross validation using different sets
of features. Here, we note that the dataset contains 11 classes,
so a random guess of the class by the model would results in
approximately 9% balanced accuracy score. Table 3 shows
that Nmap’s closed port probes perform well on their own,
reaching an F1 score of over 85%. Furthermore, we see ICMP
fuzzing was relatively successful, but not as accurate as the
more nuanced Nmap probes. We inspect the features of the
ICMP model to determine which probes are driving its per-
formance. Ultimately, three probes contribute to almost all
of the model’s performance: the ICMP echo probe, the ICMP
timestamp probe, and the ICMP address mask probe. We
train the final model using Nmap’s closed port features, the
ICMP address mask probe, and the ICMP timestamp probe
(Nmap’s probes already contain two ICMP echo probes). We
see that adding these two probes improves the accuracy of
the classifier by over 13%, and the F1 score of the classifier
by 6% to 93%. Overall, by only sending 8 network packets
to a closed port, with our methodology, we can identify a
device vendor with 91.9% balanced accuracy. Figure 2 in
Appendix A.4 shows ROC and PR curves of the final model.
Finally, we examine themodel to determinewhich features
are important. Table 7 shows the feature ranking of each
feature in the classifier. We see that the most important
feature for the classifier is the initial TTL of the packet sent
in response to the probes. We also see that many of the
features added from ICMP fuzzing lie in the top 10 features
of the classifier.
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Table 4: Distribution of the number of responses
from each device in both our labeled dataset and the
Internet-wide measurement.
Number of Responses
Dataset 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Labeled 0.8 5.7 4.2 7.7 3.6 7.3 23.6 46.7 0.6
Measurement 23.9 2.5 9.9 15.1 5.3 4.8 13.1 22.0 3.4
4 INSIGHTS ABOUT INTERNET PATHS
To demonstrate the types of new insights that device classifi-
cation can yield for existing Internet measurement datasets,
we collect a candidate set of network devices that are likely
active by parsing traceroutes from CAIDA’s Archipelago
(Ark) infrastructure [4], exploring a snapshot of the Internet
topology by downloading and parsing Ark traceroutes from
May 27, 2020. which yields network device IP addresses. We
collect a fingerprint for each IP address using Zmap, then
use the classifier trained in Section 3 to predict a class (i.e.,
vendor) for each IP address. We determine the threshold for
the classifier that provides the best F1 score; if the classifier
cannot predict a class with at least that level of confidence,
we assign an "unknown" label to the IP address.
Table 4 shows that many more IP addresses the CAIDA
Ark dataset are unresponsive to probes than in the labeled
dataset. Table 6 in Appendix A.3 shows the difference in
response rates for each specific probe in the labeled dataset
and the CAIDA measurement.
We categorize traceroutes based on the location of the
source (i.e., country of CAIDAArk node) and destination (i.e.,
continent of target IP address, based on IP geolocation from
geolite2) [10]. We do not use IP geolocation on intermediate
traceroute hops due to known inaccuracy of geolocation
on infrastructure IP addresses [11]. For each traceroute, we
tally the unique vendors that are present and calculate the
probability of encountering each vendor over the dataset
as: T raceroutes T with vendor VTotal traceroutes T . Table 5 shows the results for
popular router vendors seen in traceroutes fromArks located
in the United States and Germany.
The source countries, United States and Germany, do
show some differences in vendor prevalence. Traceroutes
from sources in Germany are more likely to include Huawei
routers compared to traceroutes from sources in the United
States. Interestingly, prevalence of traceroutes fromGermany
to Europe that Huawei is found on (48.52%) is higher than
that of traceroutes from the United States to Europe (36.99%).
We also find that traceroutes from Germany have a higher
prevalence of ZTE devices, across all target continents. On
the other hand, Juniper is less prevalent on the traceroutes
originating in Germany.
Table 5: Vendor prevalence in CAIDA Ark traceroute
dataset, by source country and destination continent.
Vendor
Source Destination Cisco Huawei Juniper ZTE
US
Africa 80.9% 44.8% 81.3% 12.3%
Asia 84.5% 56.0% 76.8% 29.4%
Europe 72.2% 37.0% 80.7% 25.5%
North America 65.6% 27.1% 73.1% 19.0%
Oceania 86.8% 35.4% 83.4% 19.4%
South America 83.7% 43.2% 86.1% 25.8%
ALL 74.5% 39.4% 77.1% 23.7%
DE
Africa 86.5% 58.0% 83.6% 37.2%
Asia 89.0% 69.9% 75.9% 61.5%
Europe 78.4% 48.5% 72.1% 46.1%
North America 88.1% 48.5% 68.6% 63.4%
Oceania 91.1% 56.5% 81.0% 45.1%
South America 91.3% 55.8% 85.8% 45.8%
ALL 86.3% 55.7% 73.1% 56.7%
5 RELATEDWORK
Vanubel et al. examined the feasibility of fingerprinting net-
work equipment in 2013 [25]. Specifically, they examine de-
fault time to live (TTL) headers in IP packets received by
through active probing. They create a signature for each
router from the different initial TTLs received from two
separate ICMP requests. Our work considers TTL values as
a feature for the classification model, but vastly differs in
the methods for generating labels, classification, and types
of probes sent to each device. Further differentiating our
work, we are the first to apply machine learning techniques
towards the discovery of network device vendors at scale.
Feng et al. examine the automatic labeling of devices with
a rule-based approach [9]. At the vendor label, they look to
label devices through the matching of 1,552 vendor names,
specifically in the IoT space. Our work differs in that we use
clustering to discover more nuanced phrases that map to
specific vendors, which we find produces a higher amount
of labels with more confidence than regex matching.
Perhaps the most well known tool in active remote device
fingerprinting is Nmap [18]. Nmap is a network scanning tool
that has developed into the most popular OS fingerprinting
tool by using knowledge of the idiosyncrasies in the TCP/IP
and the ICMP implementations in different types of devices.
Our workmakes direct use of Nmap to actively probe devices.
Fingerprinting remote devices purely via ICMP messages
was examined briefly by Arkin [1]. Arkin developed X
and XProbe to fingerprint remote operating systems solely
through ICMP messages by examining the respective re-
sponses, like ICMP error message size and integrity. Many of
the techniques introduced by Arkin are now part of Nmap.
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Kohno et al. introduced the area of remote physical device
fingerprinting [15]. The work examined the feasibility of fin-
gerprinting remote devices by examining device clock skews.
In this work, we do not consider hardware fingerprinting
methods, though we see it as a potential avenue for future
work in more granular device fingerprinting.
Raman et al. and Jones et al. leverage clustering techniques
to develop fingerprints [21, 13] for ground truth labels. While
our work uses clustering techniques to develop fingerprints
in the labeling process, we train models using the generated
models on a different set of features which allows us to
fingerprint previously unlabeled devices at scale.
6 CONCLUSION
Understanding the manufacturers of network infrastructure
on a given network is valuable knowledge to multiple parties.
In this paper, we explored the feasibility of classifying net-
work devices at scale. We have generated a labeled dataset
of over 160,000 devices using banner grabs, compiled a set
of probes that elicit unique responses from devices, trained
a classifier to distinguish between multiple vendors, and pre-
dicted network device vendors at scale using this classifier.
We specifically examine predicting IPv4 network devices in
this work, but believe the methodology could be generalized
to IPv6 network devices or other device types, such as IoT
devices.
7
REFERENCES
[1] Ofir Arkin. 2002. A Remote Active OS Fingerprinting Tool
using ICMP. USENIX ;login: 27, 2, (April 2002), 14–19.
[2] Philippe Biondi and the Scapy community. [n. d.] Scapy:
Packet crafting for Python2 and Python3. https://scapy.net/.
[3] [n. d.] CAIDA UCSD Ark IPv4 Internet Topology Data Kits –
2020-01-07. UCSD - Center for Applied Internet Data Anal-
ysis (CAIDA). https://www.impactcybertrust.org/dataset_
view?idDataset=837.
[4] [n. d.] CAIDA UCSD IPv4 Routed /24 Topology – 2020-05-27.
UCSD - Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA).
https://www.impactcybertrust.org/dataset_view?idDataset
=578.
[5] Stephen Checkoway, Jacob Maskiewicz, Christina Garman,
Joshua Fried, ShaananCohney,MatthewGreen, NadiaHeninger,
Ralf-Philipp Weinmann, Eric Rescorla, and Hovav Shacham.
2016. A systematic analysis of the juniper dual ec incident. In
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, 468–479.
[6] 2020. Cisco’s warning: Critical flaw in IOS routers allows
complete system compromise. ZDnet. (June 4, 2020). https:
//research.checkpoint.com/good-zero-day-skiddie://www.
tenable.com/blog/verizon-fios-quantum-gateway-routers-
patched- for-multiple- vulnerabilitie://www.zdnet.com/
article/ciscos-warning-critical-flaw-in-ios-routers-allows-
complete-system-compromise/.
[7] Zakir Durumeric, David Adrian, Ariana Mirian, Michael Bai-
ley, and J. Alex Halderman. 2015. A Search Engine Backed
by Internet-Wide Scanning. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Se-
curity (CCS). Ninghui Li and Christopher Kruegel, editors.
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), Denver, CO,
USA, (October 2015), 542–553. isbn: 978-1-4503-3832-5. doi:
10.1145/2810103.2813703.
[8] Zakir Durumeric, Eric Wustrow, and J. Alex Halderman.
2013. ZMap: Fast Internet-wide Scanning and Its Security
Applications. In Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX Security
Symposium (USENIX Security). Sam King, editor. USENIX
Association, Washington, D.C, USA, (August 2013), 605–620.
isbn: 978-1-931971-03-4. Retrieved 06/02/2020 from https:
//www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-
sessions/paper/durumeric.
[9] Xuan Feng, Qiang Li, Haining Wang, and Limin Sun. 2018.
Acquisitional Rule-based Engine for Discovering Internet-of-
Things Devices. In Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security
Symposium (USENIX Security). William Enck and Adrienne
Porter Felt, editors. USENIX Association, Baltimore, MD,
USA, (August 2018), 327–341. Retrieved 06/02/2020 from
https : / /www.usenix .org /conference /usenixsecurity18 /
presentation/feng.
[10] [n. d.] Geolite2 free downloadable databases. MaxMind. htt
ps://dev.maxmind.com/geoip/geoip2/geolite2/.
[11] Manaf Gharaibeh, Anant Shah, BradleyHuffaker, Han Zhang,
Roya Ensafi, and Christos Papadopoulos. 2017. A Look at
Router Geolocation in Public and Commercial Databases.
In Proceedings of the 2017 Internet Measurement Conference
(IMC). Steve Uhlig and Olaf Maennel, editors. Association
for Computing Machinery (ACM), London, United King-
dom, (November 2017), 463–469. isbn: 978-1-4503-5118-8.
doi: 10.1145/3131365.3131380.
[12] 2017. Huawei Home Routers in Botnet Recruitment. Check
Point Research. (December 21, 2017). https://research.check
point.com/good-zero-day-skiddie/.
[13] Ben Jones, Tzu-Wen Lee, Nick Feamster, and Phillipa Gill.
2014. Automated detection and fingerprinting of censorship
block pages. In Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet
Measurement Conference, 299–304.
[14] justinbstress, Alex Holland, Jeff Cody, Clayton Zimmerman,
Ricky Diaz Gomez, David Adrian, parkanzky, Alex Halder-
man, Benjamin Wireman, Andrew Sardone, Zakir Dumuric,
Jordan Wright, chushuai, thegwan, Chris Dzombak, Oleg
Broslavsky, odykyi, Luke Valenta, Elliot Cubit, Julian Korn-
berger, cindyxkuang, Benjamin VanderSloot, Stefan Grim-
minck, Meteorite, and AntraX1. [n. d.] ZGrab 2.0. https :
//github.com/zmap/zgrab2.
[15] Tadayoshi Kohno, Andre Broido, and K. C. Claffy. 2005. Re-
mote physical device fingerprinting. In Proceedings of the
26th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy (S&P). Vern Pax-
son and Michael Waidner, editors. Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Oakland, CA, USA, (May 2005),
211–225. isbn: 0-7695-2339-0. doi: 10.1109/sp.2005.18.
[16] Daniele Lepido. 2019. Vodafone Found Hidden Backdoors
in Huawei Equipment. Bloomberg. (April 30, 2019). https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-30/vodafone-
found-hidden-backdoors-in-huawei-equipment.
[17] 2020. List of networking hardware vendors. Wikipedia. https:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_networking_hardware_
vendors.
[18] Gordon Fyodor Lyon. 2009. Nmap Network Scanning: The
Official Nmap Project Guide to Network Discovery and Security
Scanning. Insecure, USA. isbn: 978-0-9799587-1-7.
[19] Lelandand McInnes, John Healy, and Steve Astels. 2017. hdb-
scan: Hierarchical density based clustering. The Journal of
Open Source Software, 2, 11, (March 2017). doi: 10.21105/joss.
00205.
[20] Fabian Pedregosa, GaÃńl Varoquaux, Alexandre Gramfort,
Vincent Michel, Bertrand Thirion, Olivier Grisel, Mathieu
Blondel, Peter Prettenhofer, Ron Weiss, Vincent Dubourg, et
al. 2011. Scikit-learn: Machine Learning in Python. Journal
of Machine Learning Research (JMLR), 12, (October 2011),
2825–2830, Oct, (October 2011).
[21] Ram Sundara Raman, Adrian Stoll, Jakub Dalek, Reethika
Ramesh, Will Scott, and Roya Ensafi. 2020. Measuring the
deployment of network censorship filters at global scale. In
Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium
2020.
[22] [n. d.] Recog: A Recognition Framework. Rapid7. https://
github.com/rapid7/recog.
[23] Tom Spring. 2019. Cisco Finally Patches Router Bugs As
New Unpatched Flaws Surface. ThreatPost. (April 5, 2019).
https://threatpost.com/cisco-finally-patches-routers-bugs-
as-new-unpatched-flaws-surface/143528/.
8
[24] Liam Tung. 2019. Cisco: Patch routers now against massive
9.8/10-severity security hole. ZDNet. (February 28, 2019).
https://www.zdnet.com/article/cisco-patch-routers-now-
against-massive-9-810-severity-security-hole/.
[25] Yves Vanaubel, Jean-Jacques Pansiot, Pascal MÃľrindol, and
Benoit Donnet. 2013. Network Fingerprinting: TTL-Based
Router Signatures. In Proceedings of the 2013 Internet Mea-
surement Conference (IMC). Krishna Gummadi and Craig Par-
tidge, editors. Association for Computing Machinery (ACM),
Barcelona, Spain, (October 2013), 369–376. isbn: 978-1-4503-
1953-9. doi: 10.1145/2504730.2504761.
[26] Zuoning Yin, Matthew Caesar, and Yuanyuan Zhou. 2010.
Towards Understanding Bugs in Open Source Router Soft-
ware. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 40,
3, (June 2010), 34–40. issn: 0146-4833. doi: 10.1145/1823844.
1823849.
9
A APPENDIX
A.1 Regular Expression Match
Below are the list of manufacturers and simple regexes used
to first match banners to a manufacturer.
Manufacturer Regexes
adtran adtran
aerohive aerohive
alaxala alaxala
allied allied
alcatel alcatel
aruba aruba
asus asus
avaya avaya
avm avm
brocade brocade
calix calix
cisco cisco, "c i s c o"
dell dell
draytek draytek
d-link d-link
enterasys enterasys
ericsson ericsson
extreme extreme
fortinet fortinet
h3c h3c
hpe hpe, hewlett
huawei huawei
juniper juniper, junos
lancom lancom
linksys linksys
meraki meraki
mikrotik mikrotik
netgear netgear
nokia nokia
openmesh open mesh
ruckus ruckus
sierra sierra
technicolor technicolor
tp-link tp-link, tplink
trendnet trendnet
ubiquiti ubiquiti
xirrus xirrus
yamaha yamaha
zyxel zyxel
zte zte,zhongxing
A.2 Nmap Probes
Here we further outline the 6 Nmap probes we used for fin-
gerprinting routers. First, we use 2 ICMP echo (ping) probes.
The first ICMP echo probe sets the don’t fragment bit in the
IP header to one, sets the IP type-of-service byte to 0, sets
the ICMP code to 9 instead of 0, the ICMP sequence number
to 295, and sends 120 bytes of 0x00 for the paylaod. While
Nmap randomly sets the IP ID and ICMP request identifier,
we use static values in our probes. The second ICMP echo
probe sets the IP type-of-service byte to 4, and the ICMP
code to 0. It sends 150 bytes of 0x00 instead of 120. Finally,
it increases the ICMP request ID and sequence number by
one from the first ICMP echo probe.
Nmap sends one UDP probe a closed port on the target
machine. This UDP port contains a payload of the character
’C’ repeated 300 times. The IP ID value is set to 0x1042.
Nmap sends this probe specifically to invoke an ICMP port
unreachable message from the target machine.
Finally, Nmap sends 3 TCP probes to a closed port on
the target machine. The TCP options for each probe are
static, corresponding to a window scale of 10, operation
(NOP), a maximum segment size of 265, a timestamp value
of 0xFFFFFFFF, and Selective ACKnowledgement (SACK)
permitted. The first TCP probe is a TCP SYN packet with
a window field of 31337. The second TCP packet is a TCP
ACK packet with the don’t fragment bit in the IP header set,
and a window field of 32768. The third TCP packet has the
FIN, PSH, and URG flags set and a window field of 65,535.
Finally, the window scale option on this probe is set to 15,
rather than 10.
A.3 Measurement Response Rate
Table 6: Response rates to each probe in both the la-
beled dataset and Internet-wide measurement.
Probe
Dataset UDP ICMPEcho 1
ICMP
Echo 2
ICMP
Timestamp
ICMP
Address Mask TCP 1 TCP 2 TCP 3
Labeled 61.6 88.3 96.7 70.7 13.2 80.9 77.8 72.5
Measurement 41.0 68.7 72.3 48.8 8.2 44.5 46.1 43.0
A.4 Classification Features and
Performance
See table and figures on the following page.
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Table 7: Features extracted from the responses to the sent probes, ranked by their importance to classification.
Feature Description Source Rank
IP initial time-to-live Calculated original time-to-live of in response Nmap 1
IP initial-time-to-live-guess If unable to calculate initial IP ttl, guess closest of {32, 64, 128, 256} Nmap 2
Responsiveness Was the probe responded to? Nmap 3
Integrity of returned probe UDP checksum Is the UDP header checksum value returned as it was sent? Nmap 4
TCP RST data checksum Is there error data in the TCP reset packet? Nmap 5
TCP flags Recorded TCP flags in response Nmap 6
ICMP sequence number ICMP sequence number received in response to ICMP packet ICMP 7
ICMP address mask ICMP address mask received in response to ICMP address mask request ICMP 8
ICMP identifier ICMP identifier received in response to ICMP packet ICMP 9
Returned probe ID value Is the IP ID value in the response to the UDP probe the same as was sent? Nmap 10
ICMP code ICMP code received in response to ICMP packet ICMP 11
TCP window size 16-bit window size in TCP header of response Nmap 12
TCP acknowledgement number Comparison of acknowledgement number in response to sequence number in probe Nmap 13
ICMP echo response code ICMP message codes received in response to Nmap ICMP echo packet Nmap 14
TCP options TCP options in response - order preserved Nmap 15
IP don’t fragment bit Was the don’t fragment bit set in the IP header? Nmap 16
TCP sequence number Comparison of sequence number in response to acknowledgement number in probe Nmap 17
IP total length IP total length of response to UDP probe Nmap 18
Unused port unreachable field nonzero Are the last four bytes in the ICMP port unreachable message set? Nmap 19
Integrity of returned UDP data Is the UDP data returned exactly as it was sent? Nmap 20
ICMP type ICMP message type received in response to ICMP packet ICMP 21
TCP quirks Is the reserved field in the TCP header of response nonzero?Is the urgent pointer field non-zero when URG flag not set? Nmap 22
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te Adtran - mean AUC: 0.99 ± 0.001
Cisco - mean AUC: 0.99 ± 0.001
Dell - mean AUC: 0.98 ± 0.005
H3c - mean AUC: 0.99 ± 0.001
Huawei - mean AUC: 0.98 ± 0.001
Juniper - mean AUC: 0.99 ± 0.001
Lancom - mean AUC: 0.99 ± 0.000
Mikrotik - mean AUC: 0.99 ± 0.000
Nec - mean AUC: 0.99 ± 0.000
Ubiquoss - mean AUC: 0.99 ± 0.004
Zte - mean AUC: 0.99 ± 0.003
(a) ROC curve for our final trained model.
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Adtran - mean AP: 0.99 ± 0.003
Cisco - mean AP: 0.99 ± 0.001
Dell - mean AP: 0.79 ± 0.033
H3c - mean AP: 0.93 ± 0.005
Huawei - mean AP: 0.94 ± 0.002
Juniper - mean AP: 0.96 ± 0.003
Lancom - mean AP: 0.99 ± 0.003
Mikrotik - mean AP: 0.95 ± 0.002
Nec - mean AP: 1.00 ± 0.001
Ubiquoss - mean AP: 0.68 ± 0.032
Zte - mean AP: 0.92 ± 0.008
(b) PR curve for our final trained model.
Figure 2: Visualizing classification performance for different vendors.
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